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My students always get a kick out of writing like this – provocative, smart, funny, and taking 
with a big idea. In this case, the idea is really big: that radar was a precursor to GPS in giving 
us a way to conceive of our universe, and to map ourselves within that universe (and that is 
only part of the thesis). Here are two typical sentences: 
In the 19th century, Geronimo could cut a telegraph line and affect an empire’s grid. He could disrupt 
communication between forts, throw off the train schedule, stop the settlers from ordering seed, and make 
it difficult for the cavalry to arrive. 
To me, this is writing so vivid and original that it stays the reader’s mind a long time. When 
we read texts like this out loud in class, the ideas are so challenging and out-of-the-ordinary 
that, at first, the cadets are startled. Then we stop reading and one 
of the students makes a connection — then a light bulb seems to go 
on over the entire classroom. 
In his dissertation, Professor Judd Case looks at the history of grids 
from the Nile, which pulled all of us into a grid of its cycles and 
rhythms, for our own protection; to geometry; to the British 
military’s invention of radar in World War II to keep the Luftwaffe 
at bay; to Sputnick; to television and finally to the contemporary 
grids of the IPod, internet, and blogoshpere. This interview and 
excerpt is only a fraction of the whole, a sort of sampler of the many 
narratives in the full dissertation. I think it is a wonderful 
introduction to Walter Benjamin, semiotics, and big thinking in 
general. 
Here, Judd Case offers writing that is so rich with ideas that I can only read two or three pages 
before I have to stop and process it. This is not easy going, but it is certainly rewarding. I hope 




Figure 1. Illustration commissioned by 
JES copyright @ 2011 Margaret Hurst 
Figure 2. C-band, 3 megawatt radar w. 
50-ft dish antenna recently installed on N. 
Kennedy Space Center. It's one of the 
largest of its kind, providing higher 
definition imagery than ever available 
before. (Photograph Wikimedia Commons). 
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Geometry, Radar and Empire 
by Judd Ammon Case 
 
Interview with Judd Case (July 2011) 
1. Mathematics seems to figure into every empire, whether in navigation or engineering or technologies of 
warfare. How did geometry impact 20th century empires? Did it affect them differently? 
Before the 20th century, empires’ lines and points were difficult to secure. People could see, 
hear, or touch telegraph lines, sentry towers, search lights, messengers, port authority offices, 
and so on. They could map empires’ flows, track their rhythms, and challenge their orderings 
and arrangements. In the 19th century, Geronimo could cut a telegraph line and affect an 
empire’s grid. He could disrupt communication between forts, throw off the train schedule, stop 
the settlers from ordering seed, and make it difficult for the cavalry to arrive. In the 
18th century, Parisians could see the food wagons rolling through the countryside. They could 
gather in cafés or impasses, or on avenues. They could sense the distance and isolation of 
Versailles. Before the 20th century, people could exploit empires’ vulnerable lines and points. 
In the 20th century, though, empires added lines and points that were mediated, private, and 
controlled. Searchlights could be seen by most anyone within range, but radar pulses could 
only be seen by those with the knowledge and means to detect them. Civil War Generals 
surveyed fields with spyglasses, but by World War I Generals were in distant rooms watching 
films recorded by surveillance aircraft. Sentries on towers can be hit with rocks, but taking out 
spy satellites requires the means of a nation state or a Bond villain. The short of it is that 
during the 20th century empires added remote lines and points. Digital technologies further 
extended this remoteness as geometries became even faster, more secure, and integrated. 
Today, grids are so controlled and extensive that Osama Bin Laden was located, in part, by his 
absence from them. He wasn’t in the phone cells, or showing up on Facebook, let alone on the 
identification software at the airport. When the Navy Seals took him out, they placed him on a 
grid, on a video sent all the way back to the White House. Today, empires are in the business of 
remote control, and those who challenge them have to adapt. 
  
2. One of your more provocative statements is that radar “…contained the potential for 
catastrophe.” Why is that? What catastrophes could the invention and use of radar cause? 
“But even as it was intended to expand and secure the nation state, to coordinate first military 
and later civilian movements, and to function as an electronic rampart, it contained the 
potential for catastrophe.” 
I think progress and catastrophe have a Jekyll-Hyde relationship. I sometimes consider them in 
physical terms: progress as forward movement and catastrophe as collision. I’m especially 
interested in collisions as there’s reality in every wreck, an unrealized progress narrative in 
every ruin. 9/11 was a moment I realized that, on the flipside, airplanes were missiles with 
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passengers. During Katrina, I considered that interstate highways were one hurricane away 
from becoming parking lots, refugee camps, or graveyards. Last year, when oil was gushing 
into the Gulf of Mexico, I heard reports of how quickly it approached the coastal marshes and 
how slowly officials reacted. I wondered at our inability to contain our own collision. 
Radar can extend nation states. When I say this, I’m thinking of things such as the Battle of 
Britain, the U.S. Air Force tracking Sputnik, and Israel using radar to detect tunnels between 
Egypt and Gaza, as well as the more pedestrian coordination of commercial flights. This 
extension obliterates distance between nation states and time for deliberation. Radar multiplies 
opportunities to perceive threats and can magnify the effects of those perceptions. When radar 
is misled by countermeasures or operators’ misinterpretations, the movements of troops, 
supplies, and civilians can be manipulated. When radar is misled by nature—such as by Libyan 
Desert Glass, migrating swans over the Suez Canal, or the moon over Thule, Greenland—its 
potential for catastrophe is also evident. 
Radar also contributes to the remote, prediction-based, push-button grids that enable nation 
states to exercise the kind of authoritarian control that concerns Lewis Mumford. On a day-to-
day basis, radar’s contribution is to things like coordinating commercial air traffic, patrolling 
national borders, and issuing speeding tickets, and it is not catastrophic. But when its technical 
attributes are exploited—such as when United Flight 93 disappeared from radar screens 
because the radar systems lost it in the concrete jungle—it contributes to catastrophes. When 
the 9/11 Commission Report discusses the hijackers’ attempts to disappear, it does so in terms of 
radar. 
 
3. For the general reader: 
a) What is semiotics? 
Semiotics is a branch of linguistics that is also taken up in communications, anthropology, 
sociology, and cultural studies. It is interested in how words, symbols, and other objects 
structure meaning through contrasts, through distinctions between one word and another, one 
concept and another, one object and another. The upshot of semiotics is that language creates 
meaning through difference and that one can understand a culture by analyzing its words, 
symbols, and other meaningful objects. 
b) Who was Walter Benjamin and why is he so important? 
Walter Benjamin was a German-Jewish intellectual who committed suicide on the French-
Spanish border while trying to escape the Nazis. He corresponded with thinkers such as Max 
Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Georg Lukács. His work blends historical materialism, 
German idealism, and Jewish mysticism, and ranges from interpretations of Baudelaire to 
musings on technology, history, urban space, aesthetics, fascism, and the human condition. 
Those in empire studies could probably sink their teeth into his The Paris of the Second Empire. 
Benjamin is important to discussions of technology and culture, to aesthetics, to assessments of 
Baudelaire, and to historians. I am taken with his historical method, and particularly with his 
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assertion that ruins and other objects that are not absorbed into progress narratives have 
disruptive power. He approaches historical objects as a quasi-surrealist or art critic; he arranges 
them into constellations and tries to disrupt the mythology of progress. 
  
4. What ideas did Harold Innis set forth in Empire and Communications that you feel have such 
meaning for us today? 
Empire and Communications considers how communication impacts empires’ centralization and 
decentralization, economics, and political change. This approach minimizes the distance 
between ancient and modern civilizations and erects a media-driven superstructure over time 
and space. It’s sweeping, high-handed, and historically dubious, but it’s also conceptually rich. 
For while Innis died long before the rise of the blogospere, his work anticipates how so many 
websites could proffer the same talking points and how satellite TV could deliver hundreds of 
channels carrying the same stories. Conceptually, Innis’ Empire and Communications is way 
ahead of his time. 
Innis is also relevant to contemporary discussions of logistics. In some ways, Innis helps me 
articulate my notion of logistical media. Scrolls, tablets, monuments, books, newspapers, 
soldiers, priests, and emperors sweep through his narrative and convey a sense of movement, 
order, and arrangement. Innis never quite articulates a notion of logistical media, but 
nevertheless, Empire and Communications brims with logistics. 
  
5. All empires depend on effective communication. How did radar help bring about a sort of modern 
global empire, where the global spaces were traversed by new “technics?” Here is the James Carey quote 
you use to introduce this idea: 
“…With the development of the railroad, steam power, the telegraph and cable, a coherent empire 
emerged based on a coherent system of communication.” 
Radar provides a point of view, a collection point for information, and in this sense it can 
centralize decision making. Radar helps transform pilots into passengers, into technical 
operators who follow the pathways established by beacons and the directions provided by air 
traffic controllers. At the same time, radar puts aircraft, automobiles, ships, orbiting satellites, 
hurricanes, tsunamis, asteroids, and so on under surveillance. In the aggregate, the effect of 
radar as a collection point is the ordering of objects into traffic, into a flow that enables a kind 
of imperial forecasting. In this aspect, radar bestows on its controllers decision making power 
that results from information moving more quickly than the objects providing it. 
When radar is networked and operated with imperial authority, it has the power of a live, 24-
hour media operation. In the situation room in Cheyenne Mountain, the officers in charge 
behave as producers and directors, the operators as script writers, the transmitters and 
receivers as cameras, the screens as frames of film, and the fighters, bombers, satellites, 
missiles, and other objects as actors. This is how radar writes an empires’ narrative, how it 
draws its lines and gathers power to its points. Carey’s discussion of telegraphs in the American 
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West starts my thinking in this direction, but with authoritative, networked radar the blanket 
of electromagnetic waves, stations, remoteness from the masses, portability, and immense 
power to coordinate objects brings objects into an empire’s narrative anywhere on the globe (or 
beneath the globe, or in space) it is deployed. 
 
7. You make a connection between electromagnetic waves and mythic ideas about invisible energy. What 
were those mythic ideas? 
When I connect electromagnetic waves to mythic ideas such as the All-Seeing eye and the bible 
teaching that “God divided the light from the darkness,” I’m claiming a relationship 
between information and movement (or in-formation, such as ships in a convoy or trumpeters in a 
marching band). I’m not especially interested in a relationship between energy and movement. 
For me, information is the fundamental object that is ordered and arranged in the name of 
logistics. Religious, governmental, economic, and military authorities mediate this ordering and 
arranging, and in this way they shape progress narratives. In this way their work is mythic and 
meaningful. 
  
8. How would you explain this quotation from Harold Innis: 
Because of modern forms of communication, “the balance between time and space has been seriously 
disturbed with disastrous consequences to Western civilization.” 
Innis says that an overabundance of light, easily moved, and short-lived communication leads 
to colossal, center-heavy, and unstable empires. In his analysis, such empires are dominated by 
a few points of view that are quickly and broadly circulated. If you imagine Roman couriers 
with papyri bearing the emperor’s dictates, Canadian trees being chopped down for the New 
York newspapers, and cell phone news bytes being dominated by the national parties’ talking 
points, you understand Innis’ concern for balance. Moreover, since Innis was Canadian and 
wrote about the American newspaper industry, it’s hard not to suspect that he was concerned 
about being on the periphery of the huge newspaper chains in the U.S. 
Innis acknowledged that Western civilization had counterbalancing, time-biased 
communication, but they didn’t seem sufficient in the face of the glut of immediate, ephemeral, 
broadly experienced media. He thought that without counterbalance, Western Civilization 
would be besieged by problems of time, such as the gradual accumulation of pollution, depletion 
of resources, and degradation of infrastructure. He thought that Western civilization would try 
to stabilize itself through the use of force. 
  
9. In the following passage, you are wary of “authoritarian technics:” 
“Paul Virilio (1989) wrote of the logistics of perception that the movie camera brought to World War I, 
of the ways generals thereafter observed battlefields remotely. Lewis Mumford (1964) described how 
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authoritarian technics—things like air traffic control systems, interstate highways, and camera 
networks—endanger nation states even as they are supposed to keep them in synch.” 
If that is so, then you must be terrified today, with handheld devices like iPhones and iPods covering the 
planet. How have today’s technics advanced your theory about radar? How have these devices changed 
our own sense of time and place? 
Nation states deploy authoritarian technics, and citizens can sometimes sense that these 
technics can themselves undercut nation states. When citizens build bomb shelters, they might 
sense the potential catastrophe lurking behind their military initiatives. When they bristle 
against security scanners at airports, they sense the threat to their freedoms. When cell phone 
data is used in court cases to prove when they were at specific locations, they might wonder if 
the right to remain silent is being trumped by networks that record passively provided 
feedback. Authoritarian technics help nations states remotely coordinate and control their 
populations, and there is always the possibility that they will become alien hands. 
Because radar is my prop to advance a theory of logistical media, much of what I say about 
radar translates into discussions of recently developed technics. Actually, I arrive at radar 
history by working backward through things like iPods and RFIDs, and even through new 
applications of radar such as anti-collision and ground penetrating systems. I consider how cell 
towers, surveillance cameras, electromagnetic waves, and other traffic control mechanisms 
occupy cities long after the people have gone back to the suburbs. Today’s technics have me 
wondering about how cell towers and Wi-Fi affect traffic flow, how a street in Chicago would 
become a ghost town without coverage. They have me considering the pervasiveness of mutual 
monitoring, video phone journalism, online police work, and the war on terror. Today’s 
technics advance what I’m saying about radar in that the issues of remote control, movement, 
and collision take new forms in the tangle that is modern telecommunications. 
Today’s technics change our sense of time and place by creating, in the language of logistics, 
new movements, collisions, and points of view. Crowds of people wearing their iPods or talking 
to “no one” through their Bluetooths, clusters of texters, stray Wi-Fi wanderers, the woman 
running her business from the coffee shop, and the odd photo phone creeper presume social 
forbearance in most places and most of the time. Where the mediated variety of homo 
communicus is prevalent, space—whether physical or virtual—is flooded with collisions, 
“WTF?” moments, technics, lines of information, points of view, and demands for flexibility. 
Today’s technics have made us a society of contortionists; we crave the freedom of the nomad 
and the fantasy of the virtual, don’t always think of surveillance as audience, and wonder if the 
tweets we send and the photo cops we speed through will cost us. 
  
10. You write this about the scientific management of society: 
“Kevin Robins and Frank Webster (1999) argued that the scientific management of society has 
overlapping economic and military implications.”  
Do the cell phones we carry around today have military implications? What are those? 
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In a word, “yes.” Any technic that provides information about identity, location, and intention, 
that passively transmits information to databases, and that can be monitored remotely has 
military implications. Specifically, cell phones have military implications when they are used to 
monitor borders and terrorists, or when they are taken off the grid to help stop protests or 
revolutions. Certainly, militaries could learn plenty from monitoring the cell phones of an 
occupied citizenry and even of their own soldiers. I also presume militaries have their own apps 
that provide new forms of remote control on battlefields and in occupied cities. 
  
11. How do you connect the lighthouse, Nicola Tesla’s mythic “death ray,” and the events of 9/11? 
Logistics. 
  
12. What is your idea of a “state of emergency?” How is it different from Naomi Klein’s? Is that what 
we are living under today? 
I refer to a “so-called state of emergency” as Benjamin’s present. It is a state of prediction, 
forecasting, prognostication, spectacle, and habituated behaviors that help nation states 
maintain their progress narratives. In the present, supposed imminent demise is a spectacle, 
ratings device, and reason to go to the mall, and there are few genuine emergencies. In 
the present genuine emergencies are avoided, downplayed, commodified, and even 
suppressed. The summary description I use in my dissertation is, “the present uses the threat of 
emergency in an attempt to sustain a state of non-emergency.” 
I do think most of us live in the present. 
I also think Klein and I agree on emergencies’ importance and qualities. However, where she 
emphasizes economic crises and how corporations sweep in with a new, capitalistic narrative 
ready for consumption, I emphasize how nation states’ prevent genuine crises from emerging in 
the first place. Additionally, I’m more concerned with technological and logistical aspects of 
emergencies than is Klein, and, like Benjamin, I assert that the disruption of the present can 
lead to healthy social change. So, if I understand Klein, she and I are working different aspects 










Excerpt from Case’s Dissertation “Geometry, Radar and Empire” is available here and a 
classroom-ready excerpt here.  
Copyright @ 2010 Judd Case 
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Postsecondary Lesson Plan to Accompany “Geometry, Radar 
and Empire” 
By Tom Durwood 
  











2. What is an “All-Seeing Eye,” a concept which seems to occur in many different cultures? Do 




















4. Drone missiles can see everything you do from two miles in the sky. They are like “all-seeing 









5. Is there a down side to the grid represented by Facebook?  Do you like being traceable, or 









6. Why does the author say that the Nile river was an original universal “organizer” or grid? 




















8. Will you have a new and more powerful type of grid to track your children in twenty years? 














Copyright @ 2011 Tom Durwood 
Figure 3. Diagram of how radar distance measurement works 
(Georg Wiora). 
